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“WINNING” THE PACIFIC WAR
 Criticisms leveled at the Japanese for their “ill conceived” or “poorly planned” attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 have failed to consider the true 
depth of vision and professional intellect of its principal architect, Commander 
Minoru Genda.1 Charges of failure to execute follow-on attacks against the har-
bor facilities, if any such attacks were planned at all, or to exploit the immediate 
advantages created in the Central Pacific after the attack are commonly made by 
both academic and professional military scholars. Genda has suffered the brunt 
of this criticism. But in fact Genda’s plans were neither ill conceived nor poorly 
assembled—they were just not executed as originally envisioned. 
The generally understood intent behind the Pearl Harbor attack was to delay 
the westward advance of the U.S. Pacific Fleet for 
up to six months, allowing Japan to complete the 
occupation and consolidation of the area it had 
designated the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.2 The attack at Pearl Harbor accomplished 
this aim. In the overall Japanese plan, the South-
ern Operation—the army’s offensives toward the 
East Indies and Southeast Asia—was the main 
military effort. However, for Genda, the Pearl 
Harbor attack had to be much more than just a 
tactical strike; it had to be the decisive action of 
the war, and he conceptualized his operational 
plans accordingly.3 A veritable treasure of unex-
amined transcripts of interviews conducted by the 
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historian Gordon Prange reveals the depth of foresight and professional wisdom 
of Genda’s concept of operations.
Between 1946 and 1951 Prange conducted no fewer than fifty-three interviews 
with Genda and other key Combined Fleet staff planners, especially Commander 
Yasuji Watanabe, the staff logistics officer, and Captain Kameto Kuroshima, the 
senior staff officer. The majority of English-language authors researching and 
writing on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have cited Prange’s own At Dawn 
We Slept and documents collected by Prange—affidavits and planning materials 
—published after his death.4 Few authors have referenced the original Genda, 
Watanabe, or Kuroshima interviews. 
A detailed review of Prange’s interviews with Genda reveals a singular focus 
on what Genda viewed as the centerpiece for any war in the Pacific between Ja-
pan and the United States—that is, Pearl Harbor. Genda’s “war winning” strategy 
rested on concentration of military efforts against the Americans, with an inva-
sion of the Hawaiian Islands as the opening move. Genda realized the military 
potential inherent in Pearl Harbor. The base and its central geographical position 
in the Pacific were the key to winning the war in the Pacific. His original concept 
of operations for attack against Pearl Harbor was designed to deliver the base 
to the Japanese or, alternatively, deny it to the Americans. A detailed analysis of 
his original and subsequent plans reveals a depth of professional understand-
ing remarkable for someone of the relatively junior rank of commander as to 
the strategic context of the war that Japan was about to start. Had his propos-
als been followed, the initial conditions in which the United States would have 
been compelled to wage war would have been significantly altered. As it was, 
however, Genda’s plans ran counter to traditional Japanese military strategy and 
were considered unpalatable by the other members of the Combined Fleet staff. 
Ultimately, the defeat of Japan was culminated before the foresight and validity 
of Genda’s original vision could be appreciated. 
To understand better the strategic relevance of Genda’s vision, it is necessary 
to grasp the larger context of Japanese military planning and decision making. 
In particular, two issues need to be understood: the unique nature of the mili-
tary within the government, and the role of the Philippines in Japanese military 
thinking. Under the Japanese constitution, the civil and military functions of 
the government were separated, with clearly delineated lines of authority—one 
through the cabinet to the civil agencies of the government, the other through 
the service chiefs to military forces. Each was independent of the other and acted 
in the name of the emperor. In actual practice, however, the military exercised a 
veto over the civil government, by virtue of the fact that the war and navy min-
isters could force the resignation of the prime minister and the formation of a 
new government simply by resigning themselves. No cabinet could exist without 
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the war and navy ministers.5 In time of war, moreover, the nation was completely 
dominated by the military—not only militarily but economically and politically. 
The military was divided into two independent entities, the Imperial Japanese 
Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The two services had their 
own organic air forces and in the interwar years saw the coming conflict from 
completely different perspectives.6 Japan envisioned three enemies: China, Rus-
sia, and the United States. The first two were viewed as the IJA’s problem, while 
any war with the United States would be fought at sea and therefore would be, for 
the most part, a matter for the IJN. From the IJA perspective, war began on 7 July 
1937, with the sudden expansion of ongoing fighting in China and commitment 
of a significant portion of the army’s resources there. The number of Japanese 
troops in China rose from 700,000 in 1937 to 850,000 by the end of 1939.7
Continuing the war in China and maintaining the gains won there largely 
underpinned Japanese strategic thinking both politically and militarily. However, 
by late 1941 the success of German armies in Europe and the weakened states of 
the Netherlands and Britain presented a perfect opportunity to expel British and 
Dutch influence from East Asia. The conditions, in fact, were favorable for Japan 
to construct, having consolidated its sphere of autonomy and security in China, 
a new order in Greater East Asia under Japanese rule.8 
Operations aimed at securing that new order beyond China would primarily 
be the task of the navy, waged against not only the British and Dutch but neces-
sarily the Americans as well, and the Philippines would be strategically critical 
for their first phase. The Philippines represented a key factor in the concept of 
the “decisive naval battle” between battleships, which was the centerpiece of IJN 
doctrine and planning in the interwar period. Supporters of this theory believed 
that a war with the United States would be decided by one great naval battle. To 
win it, the IJN had two problems: it had to find a way to lure the U.S. Pacific Fleet 
into waters close to Japan, where the Japanese planned to fight the battle, and it 
had to reduce the American advantage in battleships. The capture of the Philip-
pines was viewed as the “bait” necessary to entice the Americans westward. From 
bases in the Marshalls, Marianas, Carolinas, and other mandated islands, Japa-
nese submarines and aircraft would attack the approaching Pacific Fleet to reduce 
its strength. When the opposing forces finally met for the decisive engagement, 
there would be parity, or even a Japanese advantage, in battleships.9 
The other strategic value of the Philippines Islands was their location between 
Japan and the coveted resources of the Dutch East Indies. Once the Dutch East 
Indies were occupied, the bulk of the raw materials needed to sustain the Japa-
nese economy would have to be transported north past the Philippines to Japan.10 
The Japanese faced in this respect an operational dilemma of risk management. 
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Two options were available:
• Option one: attack and take the Dutch and British territories only, accept the 
operational risks posed by American forces astride sea lines of communica-
tions, and if the Americans engaged militarily, only then attack U.S. assets 
and territories. 
• Option two: take the Philippines at the outset, reducing the operational risk 
to Japanese sea-lanes, and plan for the war with the United States that this 
action would bring.  
Deciding on the first option would mean that such key American possessions as 
Wake and Guam could not be attacked at the outset.
On 18 October 1941, Emperor Hirohito directed Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō 
to conduct a far-reaching and comprehensive policy review of Japan’s position 
from an economic, political, and military perspective. The resulting review con-
sisted of responses to eleven questions posed by the emperor, of which the eighth 
was the most critical: “Could one limit the war adversaries only to Holland or 
only to Great Britain and Holland?” Politically the answer was yes, but military 
reasoning held sway, and the answer given was no. In the end, the Japanese mili-
tary was unwilling to accept the operational-level risks associated with leaving 
the Philippines in American hands during its initial operations.11 The decision 
was therefore made to take them, for the following purposes, as listed in the 
Japanese plans:
• To deny to American ground, sea, and air forces the use of the Philippines as 
an advance base of operations
• To secure the line of communications between the occupied areas in the 
south and Japan proper
• To acquire intermediate staging areas and supply bases needed to facilitate 
operations in the southern area.12
Given that war with the United States was now inevitable, the Japanese had 
to design a campaign that would acquire the territories needed to sustain Japan’s 
economy; destroy the American, British, and Dutch ability to project power in 
the Pacific; and then transport the raw materials of the acquired territories back 
to the home islands. It is important to note that there was no broad strategic plan 
to prosecute the war so as to achieve these objectives, coordinating all aspects of 
the effort and the national resources needed. This reality deterred joint campaign 
planning. The IJN and IJA prepared their own plans, negotiating with each other 
only as necessary to execute them. These discussions were limited to specific 
operations and did not generate a national focus. Since the IJA was the more 
powerful of the two services, it usually had its way and could veto proposed IJN 
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plans. When consensus was reached on the methodology of a specific operation, 
Imperial General Headquarters issued an “agreement,” not an operational order.13 
Critically, large-scale amphibious operations could not be conducted without the 
consent of the IJA, which would be providing the troops. 
The planning equation was complicated even further by the fact that the Naval 
General Staff (NGS) and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the 
Combined Fleet, had differing views as to the sequencing and priorities of the 
initial operations.14 Yamamoto’s greatest priority was the destruction of the threat 
posed by the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He wanted its battleships crippled or destroyed as 
early as possible, which would then facilitate operations to the south. The NGS, 
however, focused on Southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific. It wanted all 
effort concentrated on the capture of these areas as soon as possible, so that their 
raw materials could be acquired. In the NGS plans, the Pacific Fleet would be 
dealt with as needed when it decided to appear.15 
The problem for Yamamoto was that the NGS strategy did not deal with 
the major threat posed by the Pacific Fleet, then stationed in Hawaii. The NGS 
plan, operationally offensive in the south, was operationally defensive in the east 
against the Americans. It did not include a strike on Pearl Harbor. The NGS strat-
egy was designed to win early in the south but reflected no clear understanding 
of how to terminate the conflict at that point, with Japanese gains intact. It also 
had the disadvantage of relinquishing the initiative in the Central Pacific to the 
United States. 
Yamamoto, however, was convinced that the Japanese could not penetrate 
the southern region successfully without a prior strike against the Pacific Fleet.16 
He and a selected group of naval officers who had visited the United States and 
witnessed its industrial capacity knew that Japan could not win a protracted war 
with that nation. They realized that Japan’s operational advantage would be at 
its peak at the very beginning of the war. Its operations, in attacking a decidedly 
stronger opponent, had to maximize the elements of speed, concentration of 
force, and surprise, and above all else they had to retain the initiative. Yamamoto 
concluded that he had to do his best to decide the fate of the war at its outset.17 
He believed that this could be achieved only if Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 
the very first day of the war and destroyed the Pacific Fleet there. The task of de-
veloping the plan to attack Pearl Harbor was eventually assigned to Commander 
Minoru Genda.
THE “MAD” MINORU GENDA 
Gordon Prange (writing in 1947) describes Genda as follows:
He was quite small in stature with a peculiar Filipine [sic] expression and manner in 
his gesture and conversation. I noticed too that he had a pair of sharp penetrating 
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eyes and a quick and agile mind; in fact he impressed me as having somewhat of a 
trigger brain; he thinks much more quickly and more to the point than the average 
Japanese. After he warmed up to the subject [during his interviews with Prange] I 
found that his whole attitude was sympathetic. It is my honest conviction that he was 
truthful in everything he said.
Prange adds that Genda seemed a shrewd observer, a keen judge of men and of 
situations, and the possessor of more penetration and liberalness of thought than 
one would expect of a man of the Japanese military caste of that era.18 
Genda graduated from the Cadet School in 1924 at the top of his class, listing 
mathematics, strategy, and tactics as his favorite subjects. He had a reputation for 
having a progressive mind and being full of ideas, traits that placed him in stark 
contrast to his typically conservative classmates. In December 1928 he began a 
year of flight training at the Kasumigaura Air Corps; subsequently he became a 
member of the naval fighter corps and received numerous assignments to the 
Yokosuka Air Corps and the carriers Akagi and Ryūjō.19 
In 1935, Genda was selected to attend the Naval War College and in 1936 
submitted a report in response to a call for papers on the theme of a suitable 
armament of the Japanese navy for an encounter with the United States. Genda 
proposed that the navy focus on airpower—carriers and land-based bombers 
and fighters should become the new capital elements of the fleet. He advocated 
directing the navy’s expansion efforts toward the enlargement of the carrier, and 
also submarine forces, essentially making battleships irrelevant, by giving op-
posing battle fleets “nothing to shoot at.” In fact, his proposal involved scrapping 
battleships. Genda felt that Japan could achieve control of the sea only if it went 
on the offensive and could achieve victory only if it had air superiority over any 
potential enemy fleet or base.20 Genda would later claim that the students and 
instructors could not defeat his theories but still called him “mad.” Despite the 
obvious unpopularity of his academic writings, however, Genda graduated sec-
ond in his class, in July 1937.21 
The idea that the main elements of the Japanese fleet should be aircraft car-
riers protected by lighter ships was suggested almost simultaneously by two 
other sources within the IJN as well: Captain Takijiro Onishi (commander of the 
Yokosuka Naval Air Force) and several pilots assigned to the Combined Fleet. 
While an airpower focus was roundly dismissed by the mainstream IJN, the 
concept motivated the creation of an Airpower Research Committee to study “air 
effectiveness” for naval operations. In particular, its members were to investigate 
the effectiveness of air attacks against warships with bombs and torpedoes. The 
data obtained from experiments conducted by the committee were later used in 
conceptualizing the attack against Pearl Harbor.22 
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After graduation, Genda was sent to China on the staff of the 2nd Combined 
Fleet Air Corps. The air corps employed thirty-six fighters, thirty-six dive-
bombers, and thirty-six horizontal bombers in operations throughout China. 
During his short tenure in that theater (July–December 1937), the Chinese were 
able to challenge Japanese air superiority. Genda experimented with numerous 
ways of using naval fighters to support air operations, in particular as escorts for 
long-range bombing attacks. Genda is credited with developing the concept of 
advanced refueling bases close to Chinese lines. Such bases extended the shorter 
combat radius of naval fighters, allowing them to refuel on the way either to or 
back from their targets.23 
The lessons learned from the operations over China fundamentally shaped 
Genda’s thinking about air warfare. The Japanese were experimenting with the 
projection of naval airpower ashore, utilizing long-range strategic bombing, 
fighter escort, and strafing as deliberate missions.24 The fundamental rule of any 
air battle, in turn, was to gain immediate control of the local air by eliminating 
the defensive activity of enemy fighter planes.25 China convinced Genda that 
fighters were a more powerful factor than he had previously realized and that 
they were most effective used offensively, to control the air war: “The most ef-
fective and wise way of making use of fighter units was to use them positively in 
seeking a decisive engagement with enemy fighters in the air. To this end, the use 
of fighters on other missions such as escorting bombers or surface forces should 
be limited as much as permissible.”26 Genda’s conclusions reinforced the propen-
sity of Japanese fighter pilots to seek duels with other fighters at the expense of 
protecting bombers. 
The second important lesson that Genda learned from China concerned mass: 
“Facts evidently proved that piecemeal attacks could not inflict destructive dam-
age; in order to launch effective bombings, a destructive blow should be given in 
a short while [i.e., over a short period of time], using a great number of planes 
at one time.” Genda’s China experience reinforced his belief that without a siz-
able air fleet, both carrier- and land-based, Japan could not engage in modern 
warfare.27 
In December 1938 Genda was appointed as the assistant naval attaché at the 
Japanese embassy in London. He arrived there in March 1939 and remained 
until September 1940. Genda’s mission was to gather as much information as he 
could on British air forces. The outbreak of war in Europe and the air combat that 
developed allowed Genda to crystallize his thoughts on airpower. Once again he 
witnessed the impact of mass, whereby “the Nazis’ use of air forces en masse, in 
one wave or in successive waves, evidently proved very effective in spite of their 
inferior abilities.”28 
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Genda was convinced by all this that air superiority was the key to success 
in any campaign, land or sea, and that air superiority was a function of mass 
and possession of superior fighter aircraft.29 (At this point, Genda was unaware 
of the existence and performance capabilities of the Japanese Zero fighter.) He 
feared that Japanese naval authorities would draw the wrong conclusions from 
the air war in Europe, since Japanese naval officers kept pointing out that even 
Germany’s huge air fleets were unable to defeat or damage the ships of the Royal 
Navy. Genda countered with the fact that German pilots were trained to partici-
pate in land-centric campaigns and not over the seas.30 On his return to Japan, 
Genda began a campaign to change thinking about aircraft design. In particular, 
Japanese naval aircraft were not protected by armor; their fuel tanks and pilots 
were exposed. He pointed out that the German planes protected both and argued 
that these changes were necessary for all Japanese planes.31 
In November 1940 Genda was posted on board the aircraft carrier Kaga as the 
air staff officer of the 1st Carrier Division and tasked with preparing a new train-
ing program for carrier warfare. His experiences in both China and the United 
Kingdom had convinced Genda that to attack an enemy effectively, airpower had 
to be concentrated. If carriers were scattered—as they currently were, in different 
fleets—it would be too difficult to concentrate combat power on one objective. 
The carriers had to be grouped together, and they had to maneuver as a unit. He 
reasoned that a massed formation would enhance both the defensive and offen-
sive natures of carrier warfare. Concentration would allow the carriers to pool 
fighter resources for their own defense, making remaining fighters available to be 
used offensively in support of torpedo and bombing planes. 
The new concept of concentrating carriers was accepted by the commander 
of the Tateyama Naval Air Detachment, Rear Admiral Michitaro Totsuka, but 
what “concentration” meant with respect to numbers and tactical dispositions 
of carriers needed to be determined. The concept was tested with the carriers 
Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū of the 1st and 2nd Air Squadrons.32 Akagi had begun 
an overhaul in November 1940 and was unavailable. The formal realization of 
carrier concentration came with the formation of the 1st Air Fleet, composed of 
the 1st (Akagi, Kaga), 2nd (Hiryū, Sōryū), and 3rd (light carriers Zuihō, Hōshō) 
Carrier Divisions, under the command of Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, on 10 
April 1941.33 
In February 1941, Genda was called to a meeting with Takijiro Onishi, now 
a rear admiral and chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet. Besides enjoying 
Yamamoto’s trust and confidence, Onishi was rated as one of Japan’s few genuine 
“air admirals.” Though primarily concerned at the time with land-based avia-
tion, Onishi was a vigorous advocate of carrier warfare.34 Yamamoto had asked 
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Onishi to begin a study on the possibility of using the air squadrons of the 1st 
and 2nd Carrier Divisions for a surprise attack against the American fleet at 
Pearl Harbor.
Onishi showed Genda a three-page letter that Yamamoto had sent him. In 
it Yamamoto proposed the use of torpedo bombers on a one-way mission. The 
torpedo bombers were to be launched five hundred miles from Pearl Harbor, a 
distance that was beyond their normal combat radius. Once they were launched, 
the carriers would return to Japan. The torpedo planes would complete the at-
tack and then fly back in the direction of the task force and ditch at sea; destroy-
ers would pick up the aircrews. Yamamoto wanted to target only battleships. 
He appreciated the importance of destroying aircraft carriers but believed that 
the psychological effect on the American people of destroying all the American 
battleships would be greater than that of the destruction of carriers.35 
Genda returned to Kaga and worked on a plan of his own for about two weeks. 
Genda supported Yamamoto’s concept of a surprise attack but bitterly opposed 
the proposed tactics. A one-way attack would not allow for follow-on attacks, 
which were necessary to achieve decisive effect. Using only torpedo bombers 
made the attack one-dimensional, which meant that if conditions were not perfect 
—if, for example, the weather or visibility were poor or the Americans were 
alerted—the effects would be minimized. Genda wanted a coordinated attack, 
one that combined torpedo, dive-, and horizontal bombers, protected by fighters. 
His approach provided for multiple methods of attack and could deal with almost 
any situation, including, if necessary, the aircraft having to fight their way in to 
the target. A coordinated attack had greater flexibility and a higher probability 
of success. Genda opposed Yamamoto’s plan also because he viewed it as a ter-
rible waste of aircraft and probably of highly trained pilots as well (the proposed 
rescues at sea being highly problematic), which Japan could not easily replace.36 
The basic elements of Genda’s proposed plan were as follows: 
• The main objectives of the attack should be the American carriers (because 
he felt that they would be the real capital ships of the coming war) and land-
based planes. 
• The blow had to be strong enough to eliminate the American fleet as a threat 
for at least six months—the time considered necessary to occupy the Dutch 
East Indies. 
• All of Japan’s carrier strength should be used, without exception. Torpedo 
bombers would deliver the main attack, but because it was not known 
whether torpedoes could be successfully launched in the shallow waters of 
Pearl Harbor, shorter-range dive-bombers also had to be employed.
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• The range of Japanese carriers was not enough to permit a trip to Pearl Har-
bor and back; therefore Japan had to study and perfect at-sea replenishment 
in the harsh conditions expected of the North Pacific. 
• The operation had to be a complete surprise.
Genda concluded that the operation would be difficult but not impossible.37 
Genda briefed his proposal to Onishi, and the two officers discussed it for 
about two hours. Genda argued that it was desirable to land forces on Oahu im-
mediately after the air raid, thus making the attack decisive by denying the Amer-
icans the means to project power across the Central Pacific. Onishi dismissed 
the idea, holding that Japan’s power was not sufficient to permit simultaneous 
operations in the Philippines, the Indies, and Oahu.38 
Onishi submitted Genda’s draft unedited to Yamamoto, adding his own com-
ments and thoughts separately, in March 1941. Onishi’s ten-page (according 
Genda in postwar interviews) report does not survive, and it is not clear whether 
—though the paper included all of Genda’s recommendations and a few of Oni-
shi’s own—the idea of invading Oahu was part of it. Onishi wanted to target U.S. 
cruisers, in order to unbalance the American fleet. Also, he favored horizontal 
bombing over dive-bombing, because bombs dropped by dive-bombing did not 
have sufficient velocity to penetrate the armor of battleships, and horizontal 
bombing would minimize Japanese casualties.39 
While the concept of an attack against Pearl Harbor remained in the fore-
fronts of the minds of those who were aware of what Yamamoto was thinking, 
formal, detailed planning for the attack did not happen until the fall of 1941. In 
the interim, the 1st Air Fleet concentrated on improving the tactical dispositions 
and maneuvering of the carriers and the bombing accuracy and technique of 
aircrews. Yamamoto eventually accepted the idea of repeated attacks to achieve a 
decisive result.40 That having been decided, Yamamoto did not interfere with the 
planning effort. He now focused on convincing the NGS to allow him to execute 
the operation.41
THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR WAR
Commander Yasuji Watanabe, a trusted member of Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet 
staff, later described the conceptual foundation of the opening Japanese opera-
tions in this way: 
In Japanese tactics we are told when we have two enemies, one in front and one in 
the back, first we must cut in front by sword. Only cut and not kill but make it hard. 
Then we attack the back enemy and kill him. Then we come back to the front enemy 
and kill him. This time we took that tactic, having no aim to capture Pearl Harbor but 
just to cripple it. We might have returned to capture later.42
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The basic Japanese plan for war, placed into effect in December 1941, con-
sisted of three phases: 
Phase One: The seizure of the Southern Areas; the attack on the United States Fleet 
in Hawaii, and the seizure of strategic areas and positions for the establishment of a 
perimeter for the defense of the Southern Resources Area and the Japanese Main-
land. The area to be seized was that within the line which joins the Kuriles, Marshalls 
(including Wake), Bismarcks, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Burma.
Phase Two: Consolidation and strengthening of the defensive perimeter, and
Phase Three: The interception and destruction of any attacking strength, which 
might threaten the defensive perimeter or the vital areas within the perimeter. Con-
currently with intercept operations the activation of plans to destroy the United States 
will to fight. 
Through these three phases, the Japanese hoped to attain their strategic goal of 
economic self-sufficiency.43 
The NGS’s existing orders to Yamamoto contained two main tasks: one, the 
destruction of the enemy fleet or fleets; and two, coordination with the army in 
capturing and gaining control of the southern area. The methods to be employed 
in the destruction of the enemy fleet were up to Yamamoto, but he could not 
activate any plan without the approval of the NGS. Regarding the second task, 
the duty of the navy was to support the army’s efforts with both its fleet and its 
land-based air force.44 
Japanese military planners were now faced with moving forces rapidly over 
long distances to acquire the key strategic territories of the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
while defeating any Allied forces present. Gains would have to be defended 
against the inevitable Allied counterattacks. Having limited warships, transports, 
and ground forces for the tasks envisioned, the planners had to use key forces for 
multiple tasks.45 This necessity resulted in the decision to sequence the elements 
of Phase One. Success was dependent on Japan’s ability to seize and maintain the 
initiative. Maximum use would have to be made of airpower to prepare and shape 
the battle space. Phase One was to be completed in 150 days. 
The following critical assumptions guided Japanese planning and decision 
making leading up to the outbreak of war:
• That the threat of Russia on the Manchurian flank had been neutralized by 
decisive German victories in Europe. 
• That Great Britain was in an irretrievably defensive position.
• That the forces that the United States and its allies could immediately deploy 
in the Pacific, particularly in the air, were insufficient to prevent Japan from 
occupying within three or four months the entire Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
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• That China—the Burma Road having been severed—would be isolated and 
forced to negotiate. 
• That the United States, committed to aiding Great Britain and weakened by 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, would be unable to mobilize sufficient strength 
to go on the offensive in the Pacific for from eighteen months to two years. 
During this time, the perimeter could be fortified and the required forward 
airfields and bases established. The perimeter would be backed by a mobile 
carrier striking force based on Truk.
• That Japan would speedily extract in the captured territories and ship to 
home islands for processing essential metals to sustain and strengthen its 
industrial and military machine. 
• That the weakness of the United States as a democracy would make it im-
possible for it to sustain any all-out offensive action in the face of the losses 
that would be imposed by fanatically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen, and the elimination of its allies. The United States would therefore 
compromise and allow Japan to retain a substantial portion of its initial ter-
ritorial gains.46 
Unfortunately for the Japanese, the fifth and seventh assumptions were to prove 
false. 
On 5 November the following operational objectives were issued: 
 a. In the Eastern Pacific, the American fleet would be destroyed and her supply route 
and line of operation to the Orient severed,
 b. In the Western Pacific, the campaign in Malaya shall be conducted to sever the 
British line of operation and supply to the Orient as well as the Burma Route,
 c. The enemy forces in the Orient shall be destroyed, their strategic bases captured, 
and the important areas endowed with natural resources shall be occupied,
 d. Strategically important points shall be captured, expanded in area and strength-
ened in defensive forces in order to prepare for a prolonged war,
 e. Enemy invading forces shall be intercepted and annihilated, and
 f. Successful operations shall be exploited to crush the enemy’s will to fight.47 
The one significant constraint imposed was that Japanese operations had to begin 
before the British and Americans could supplement their forces in the theater and 
thereby alter the balance of power.
Strategic success would be achieved, because Japan would escalate the ma-
terial and moral costs of war beyond what the Western powers, America in 
particular, would be willing to pay. The strategy was predicated on American 
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rationality—that is, the Americans would perform a cost-benefit analysis and 
come to terms with the realities created by Japanese success.48 
The conventional narrative on the Pacific War has it that Japan never intended 
to invade Hawaii. This view asserts that the Japanese leadership felt Hawaii was 
too difficult to capture and retain and that it was in any case outside the desired 
limits of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.49 However, we now know 
that Hawaii was in fact explicitly included within the sphere in both public and 
classified wartime documents and was the focus of Genda’s thinking from the 
beginning.50 
Genda understood that Pearl Harbor was the headquarters of the Pacific 
Fleet, a crucial logistics and repair facility, a vital intelligence center, and an ideal 
springboard for any counteroffensive against Japan. Hawaii was also the anchor 
for air and maritime communications between the United States and the south-
western Pacific. From the moment Genda began preparing his draft, he favored 
a full-scale landing of Japanese troops on Oahu. “We should follow up this attack 
on Hawaii with a landing,” he said. “If Hawaii is occupied, America will lose her 
largest and best advance base and, furthermore, our command of future opera-
tions will be very good.” American fighting forces on Hawaii would have to retire 
to the West Coast, and Japan would dominate the Central Pacific.51 Genda’s con-
ceptualized plan, that is, took Yamamoto’s intent one step farther—to take Pearl 
Harbor away from the Americans and thereby eliminate their ability to project 
power from the Central Pacific. Once in Japanese hands, the Hawaiian Islands 
could be used militarily to threaten the continental United States and, politically, 
as a bargaining chip in negotiations to end the war.52 The key to Genda’s vision 
was not what Japan would gain by acquiring the islands but what the United 
States would lose. 
It is in this plan that the true nature of Genda’s operational-level thinking is 
manifest. Genda believed that without seizing and holding Oahu, Japan could 
not hope to win the war. Oahu had to be taken at the outset of the conflict, while 
surprise and initiative still worked in Japan’s favor. Once it had been occupied, 
conditions would be favorable for subsequent operations in the south, and Japan 
would have time to figure out how to maintain and resupply the islands. Genda 
believed that Hawaii, not the Philippines, should have been Japan’s major mili-
tary objective at the outset. Where Yamamoto saw a delaying action, Genda saw 
a knockout punch—the annihilation of the enemy’s operational center of gravity 
with one decisive, joint operation.53 
Assuming that the initial air strikes were successful and that the Japanese had 
air superiority and given intelligence estimates of approximately two American 
divisions on Oahu, Genda believed ten to fifteen thousand well equipped troops 
would suffice for its capture.54 Genda realized the risks involved in moving a large 
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task force across the North Pacific to attack Oahu, but he felt that even if (as the 
Japanese expected) a portion of the force was destroyed, the loss of shipping and 
troops would not materially impact operations in the south.55 
Predictably, so innovative a plan, coming originally from a mere commander 
(though possibly over the signature of a rear admiral), did not survive contact 
with the senior planners of the Combined Fleet staff, particularly at a time when 
the concept of a carrier air attack, backed by Yamamoto himself, was itself expe-
riencing stiff opposition. But during naval war games to test the planned Phase 
One operations in September 1941, the idea of invading Oahu resurfaced. In 
preparation for the event, Commander Watanabe conducted a detailed study of a 
possible invasion of Oahu. He estimated that a successful invasion would require 
at least two Japanese divisions, about thirty thousand men. Transporting them, 
with their equipment and supplies, would require eighty transports and escort 
vessels, including thirty-two destroyers, eight cruisers, four battleships, two air-
craft carriers, six to eight submarines for reconnaissance, and ten tankers. These 
would be in addition to the carrier strike force.56
Watanabe laid out two landing sites: one on the northwest coast on both sides 
of Haleiwa, the other in the area of Kaneohe Bay. The southern coast was best 
suited to an invasion, but it was also the most heavily defended area of Oahu. The 
west coast was eliminated, because the U.S. Navy had held invasion maneuvers 
off the west coast a year before, and the Americans were likely well prepared to 
defend that part of the island.57
The two landings would happen simultaneously at midnight of 7/8 December. 
Half a division would land at Haleiwa, to take Schofield Barracks. The objectives 
of this attack were not only to take the barracks but to draw American forces 
northward, by giving the impression that it was the main effort. The actual main 
attack, however, was planned for the east coast, at Kaneohe Bay, with one and a 
half divisions. Two-thirds of this force would occupy that, the remainder the re-
gion below Laie. The objective was to cross the Koolau Range, using horses, and 
then descend on Pearl Harbor, cutting off any retreat to the mountains of Oahu. 
The Japanese knew from intelligence that the Koolau mountains were not forti-
fied and in fact were open to the public. Given complete air superiority, Watanabe 
estimated, it would take from two to four weeks to capture the island.58 
Watanabe tried to discuss the study with Captain Kuroshima but the latter 
was not interested, considering an invasion infeasible and to be going against the 
concept of operations for Phase One. After the war, Kuroshima would declare 
that the “biggest mistake” of his life was this refusal to consider invasion of Oahu 
after the carrier attack.59 Genda’s and Watanabe’s superiors, for their part, always 
considered the idea in the context of the invasions of the Philippines and Malaya, 
also to be accomplished at the outset. Considered accordingly, an invasion of 
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 1, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/8
 C A R AVAG G I O  9 9
Oahu was easily dismissible from a resource perspective. Genda himself, in con-
trast, viewed the invasion as either instead of or before the Philippine operation, 
with the intent of denying American ground, sea, and air forces the use of the 
Hawaiian Islands as an advance base. 
Regardless, any invasion of Oahu would have needed the support of the army, 
which was firmly focused on China and willing to provide only the smallest 
number of divisions necessary to acquire the territories identified in Phase One. 
In fact, the IJA planned to commit only ten of its fifty-one divisions and four of 
its fifty-nine brigades to the Southern Army for these operations.60 Notably, how-
ever, and reflecting the important role envisioned for airpower, the IJA allotted 
seventy of its 151 air squadrons to support the Southern Operation.
The mistrust that existed between the two services is evident from the fact that 
the Combined Fleet never approached the IJA to discuss a Hawaiian invasion op-
tion. The Combined Fleet was so concerned with the secrecy of the Pearl Harbor 
carrier attack that it did not want to divulge the plan to the army. The Combined 
Fleet’s fear was based on the IJA’s strong influence over governmental decision 
making—if the IJA objected to the attack, it could easily force its cancelation. 
Watanabe lamented that “once they [IJA] rejected something, nothing could be 
carried out.”61 
For all these reasons, and despite repeated attempts by Genda to drive home 
the importance of taking the islands, the idea of invading Oahu as part of the 
initial attack was dead. Knowing that there was no stomach for invading Oahu as 
he had wanted, Genda moved to the next best course of action available, which 
was to design a plan that would deny Pearl Harbor to the Americans, through the 
destruction of the base and its facilities. “In my opinion, Japan had to neutral-
ize American bases in the Pacific if she was to carry on the war successfully.”62 
Genda’s modified plan involved repeated attacks against the infrastructure of 
Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet at its moorings, and a possible fleet engagement 
against any American warships found outside the harbor. A significant problem 
for Genda was that Vice Admiral Nagumo, who commanded the 1st Air Fleet, 
had little faith in or understanding of naval airpower or the potential of the air 
arm at his disposal.63 
Nagumo was aligned with the IJN’s “fleet faction.” These officers—politically 
right-wing, pro-Axis, virulently anti-British and anti-American—were ardent 
expansionists and favored the rapid buildup of Japan’s naval strength. They be-
lieved in the supremacy of the battleship in naval warfare, were deeply schooled 
in the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and were committed to the vision of 
decisive battle by surface fleets.64 Since 1934 they had purged the Japanese naval 
hierarchy and now held almost all the key command and institutional positions, 
particularly in the NGS. 
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The conventional explanation of the decision to give Nagumo command of 
the 1st Air Fleet is that it came down to seniority, not expertise. Nagumo was a 
surface fleet officer and specialist in torpedo attack. Even his longtime friend Ad-
miral Tsukahara Nishizo, later commander in chief of the 11th Air Fleet, would 
recall, “He [Nagumo] was wholly unfitted by background, training, experience, 
and interest for a major role in Japan’s naval air arm.”65 In fact, the feeling of many 
in the carrier community, including key members of the Combined Fleet staff, 
was that Nagumo’s background and personality made him completely unsuitable 
as the commander of the Japanese carriers. Nagumo’s appointment, however, was 
made by the NGS, not the Combined Fleet. Yamamoto’s choice was Vice Admiral 
Jisaburō Ozawa, but at this point Yamamoto did not have a strong enough case to 
induce the NGS to remove Nagumo. 
The Pearl Harbor portion of the Combined Fleet plan met stiff opposition 
from all quarters, including the NGS, Nagumo, and Nagumo’s chief of staff, Rear 
Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka. They viewed the plan as too risky, as beyond the 
technical capability of the IJN (primarily because of the need for at-sea refueling), 
and as denying carrier airpower to the vital Philippines operation. Genda realized 
that there were significant tactical issues to be resolved but felt that they were not 
insurmountable.66 It would be early November, however, before the attack was 
finally approved at the joint and thus national level. 
The IJN held a series of war games from 5 to 17 September 1941 to test Phase 
One of its operational plan. Two days were set aside for a separate and secret test 
of the proposed outline of the Pearl Harbor plan. Genda had yet to complete any 
detailed planning, but at this point the plan used all six “fleet carriers”—that is, 
Hiryū, Sōryū, Akagi, Kaga, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. The Pearl Harbor game sug-
gested that the attack was feasible but involved significant risk and would very 
likely result in the loss of Japanese carriers.67 Ultimately, however, these results 
were overshadowed by a greater operational concern raised by the main war-
game series—air superiority over the Philippines. 
At the conclusion of the games, 11th Air Fleet representatives raised serious 
concerns over their ability to supply sufficient strength, especially fighters, for the 
Southern Operation. Air superiority was in jeopardy, because the distances be-
tween the Philippine targets and Japanese bases were beyond the combat radius 
of the Zero fighter.68 On 24 September, senior officers of the Combined Fleet, 1st 
Air Fleet, and NGS met to discuss this problem. The 1st Air Fleet chief of staff, 
Kusaka, and senior members of the NGS spoke out against the Pearl Harbor plan, 
arguing that naval strength assigned to the Southern Operation was insufficient 
and that all air resources, including the 1st Air Fleet, should be concentrated on 
that.69 Admiral Onishi, formerly the conduit for the Pearl Harbor attack concept, 
now vehemently opposed it. He too argued that the carriers were needed by the 
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Southern Operation. The NGS subsequently directed that fleet carriers from the 
1st Air Fleet be made available to support the southern attacks. 
It is important at this point to take a quick step backward in time. On 19 Au-
gust 1941, Genda met with the senior staff officer of the 11th Air Fleet, Captain 
Chihaya Takahashi, to discuss the overall strategy for air operations, both Pearl 
Harbor and the Southern Operation.70 The IJA and IJN agreed that the major role 
in the Philippine air campaign was the responsibility of the IJN, because of the 
greater combat range of naval aircraft. Army fighters had been designed to fight 
on the mainland of China and had a nominal combat radius of three hundred 
miles. Army bombers, carrying a normal bomb load, could not make the round 
trip between southern Taiwanese bases and Lingayen Gulf, the principal landing 
point on Luzon.71 Consequently, it had been agreed between the two services that 
IJA planes would be responsible for targets north of the sixteenth parallel (which 
crosses Luzon north of Manila), while IJN air forces would take care of targets 
south of that line. The major American air strength, some 208 fighters and bomb-
ers, was stationed below that line and therefore the responsibility of the IJN.72 
The Philippine invasion air plan involved virtually every Zero fighter the navy 
had except for those of the 1st Air Fleet. The Zero possessed a combat radius in 
excess of 420 miles, but there were serious doubts that it could support attacks on 
targets in the Manila area, 550 miles from Japanese bases on Taiwan. Navy plan-
ners now found themselves confronted with an urgent operational problem, for 
which two possible solutions presented themselves. Either the fleet aircraft car-
riers had to provide the necessary fighter cover, the more likely option, or means 
would have to be found to increase the Zero’s range, which seemed improbable.73 
Either way, fighter cover for the bombers was imperative, if Pearl Harbor was 
to be attacked on the first day of the war. The Philippine air attack had to hap-
pen in daylight, and there was a five-and-a-half-hour time difference between 
there and Pearl Harbor. Consequently, the Japanese expected that Philippine- 
American defenses would be ready for any Japanese attack on 8 December. 
The conflict over the simultaneous requirements for air superiority over Pearl 
Harbor and the Philippines came to a head in October.74 During the final war 
games held on 4 and 5 October, the NGS directed that the fleet carriers be split, 
with the 2nd Carrier Division (Hiryū and Sōryū), plus Akagi, supporting the 
Philippine invasion and the remaining three carriers attacking Pearl Harbor. The 
NGS wanted more airpower for the Philippine attack and held that it had prior-
ity. The results of the war games indicated, however, that three carriers could not 
generate enough combat airpower to achieve the desired results at Pearl Harbor. 
If the Pearl Harbor attack were to be forced to use only three carriers, Genda 
recommended that it be scrapped.75 
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Repeated attempts by the Combined Fleet to have all six carriers reassigned 
to the Pearl Harbor attack failed, until on 17 October Yamamoto sent Captain 
Kuroshima to NGS headquarters in Tokyo to convey the message that if the Pearl 
Harbor plan were not approved with six carriers, Yamamoto and his entire staff 
would resign. On 22 October, Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, Yamamoto’s chief 
of staff, recorded that Kuroshima had returned with the plan approved as the 
Combined Fleet wanted it.76 Most narratives have taken Yamamoto’s threat of 
resignation as the major factor in the decision of Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of 
the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, to approve, at the navy level, the Pearl 
Harbor plan with six carriers. 
But if taking the carriers of the 2nd Carrier Division away from the Philippine 
operation solved the Pearl Harbor problem, it did not resolve what was in the 
minds of the NGS the more critical operational problem: the need to attain and 
maintain air superiority over the Philippines. It is not reasonable to infer that 
Admiral Nagano would have knowingly placed his top priority, the Philippine 
operation, in jeopardy by removing the carrier airpower that had been regarded 
as vital for supporting its initial attacks. We must therefore look elsewhere to 
determine why Nagano changed his mind—and why, therefore, Genda’s plan was 
actually carried out. 
The operational requirement on 8 December was fifteen minutes of combat 
time for Zeros over Clark Airfield, the main American airfield in the Philippines. 
By mid-October, experimentation by the 11th Air Fleet had achieved a combat 
radius of five hundred miles for its Zeros without any modification to the plane’s 
engine or equipment. This was accomplished by reducing cruising speed, adjust-
ing propeller pitch, and setting the fuel mixture as lean as possible. Pilot skill 
would be counted on to deliver the remaining fifty miles to the target. Plans were 
made for the occupation of Batan Island, 125 miles north of Luzon, on the morn-
ing of 8 December so that the Zeros could make an emergency fueling stop there 
on the return trip if necessary. 
The Zero was now capable of providing the requisite air cover for the initial 
attacks from Taiwan.77 This development is more compelling than Yamamoto’s 
threat of resignation as a reason why Nagano changed his mind. The Japanese 
could now simultaneously commit the six fleet carriers to the Pearl Harbor op-
eration and provide the required Zero cover over the Philippines. 
On 29 October, two officers of the NGS—Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka and 
Commander Yugi Yamamoto, of the Operations Section—visited Admiral Ya-
mamoto on board the battleship Nagato. They brought the general war instruc-
tions of the NGS and the relevant “agreement” between the navy and the army. 
The attack on Pearl Harbor was not part of this document. On 3 November, 
the staff of the Combined Fleet flew to Tokyo to put the finishing touches on 
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Combined Fleet Order No. 1. There, on 3 November, Yamamoto talked to Nagano; 
the final decision to allow the attack on Pearl Harbor was made on that day.78
The evolution of the detailed Pearl Harbor attack plan needs to be clarified. 
Until the end of September the plan existed as a conceptual attack that began with 
a two-wave integrated assault using dive-bombers, torpedo bombers, horizontal 
bombers, and fighters. The main targets were to be the airfields, carriers, and 
battleships. Little detail existed beyond that. Commander Mitsuo Fuchida was 
told of the plan and target on 1 October. Genda and Fuchida began putting details 
to the attack during October. Their plan involved all six fleet carriers, but as noted 
above, this was not a foregone conclusion. 
On 2 November, Nagumo informed the senior commanders of the 1st Air 
Fleet of the intent to attack Hawaii and had Fuchida and Genda brief the “general 
plan.”79 The general concept was tested by the 1st and 2nd Carrier Divisions dur-
ing Combined Fleet maneuvers on 3 and 5 November. Lessons learned from the 
attacking formations and observations from Genda, Fuchida, and the Combined 
Fleet staff were then used to refine the plan. There were many technical details 
that had yet to be resolved. Chief among these was the fact that the torpedoes 
were still running too deep to be effective in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. 
The final details were hammered out at Hitokappu Bay just prior to departure. 
Genda conceptualized the plan (answering the “who, what, and why” questions), 
identified and worked to resolve the technical deficiencies in torpedoes and 
bombs, and organized the training along functional lines to facilitate the attack. 
The details of the “how” portion of the attack for each aircraft type were left to 
the respective flight commanders. Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata 
worked out the torpedo attack plan, Lieutenant Commanders Takashige Egusa 
and Kakuichi Takahasi the dive-bombing attacks, and Lieutenant Commanders 
Shigeru Itaya and Saburo Shindo the fighter attack plan. Fuchida and Lieutenant 
Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki worked out the horizontal-bombing plan.80 
These inputs were then integrated by Genda to form the finalized plan.81 The 
final attack plan was briefed to all aircrews at Hitokappu Bay on 23 November. 
The 1st Air Fleet departed for Pearl Harbor at six o’clock in the morning of 26 
November.
THE ATTACK AND ITS IMMEDIATE SEQUEL 
Nagumo, in command of the 1st Air Fleet, had opposed the attack on Pearl Har-
bor from the very beginning and was not comfortable with his responsibility in 
executing it. He was being ordered to carry out a plan that he did not believe in. 
Japanese naval doctrine, however, allowed considerable latitude to on-scene com-
manders to modify plans as they saw fit; Nagumo, unbeknownst to anyone on the 
Combined Fleet staff, decided even before leaving Japan that he would execute 
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the plan to the minimum extent possible, making the American battleships the 
primary targets. Nagumo was unprepared to go beyond his doctrinal comfort 
zone to make the conceptual leap that Genda’s plan envisioned. 
Nagumo’s personal and professional inclinations convinced him that his job 
was to inflict enough damage on the American battleships to make them unable 
to interfere with Japanese operations in the south. Genda, the visionary and air-
power advocate, had designed the attack to eliminate the base at Pearl Harbor and 
thereby deny the Americans the use of the base and its inherent ability to support 
the projection of power across the Central Pacific. Genda’s focus comprised the 
base and aircraft carriers. The planner and the executor were driving toward dif-
ferent ends. Unfortunately for Genda and ultimately the Japanese, Nagumo, as 
the tactical commander, would decide what conditions or results defined success.
The preamble to Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3, issued 
on 23 November 1941, includes the following statement:
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units [the “waves” con-
stituting the first attack], preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this 
time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as 
long as the supply lasts. If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progress-
es favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will 
be achieved.82
This order, over Nagumo’s signature, was probably written by Genda and there-
fore congruent with Genda’s concept of operations for the attack. Most impor-
tantly, it conveys the expectation of repeated attacks. The contradiction between 
what Nagumo issued as his intention in this order and his personal conviction to 
launch only the first attack is evident and has caused confusion. 
The order was issued while the 1st Air Fleet was still in Japanese waters. This 
means that the Combined Fleet would have been aware of, and approved of, its 
contents. It is quite possible that Nagumo was content to make it appear that he 
intended to act aggressively in executing his orders until he left the home islands 
and the scrutiny of the Combined Fleet. Rear Admiral Ugaki had chastised both 
Nagumo and Kusaka for their lack of support for the Pearl Harbor plan and 
had declared that if they “were not prepared yet to advance in the face of death 
and gain results two or three times as great as the cost by jumping into the jaws 
of death with his [sic] men,” they both should resign.83 Once the task force was 
sequestered in the Kuriles, at Hitokappu Bay, Nagumo made it known to Genda 
that he would launch only the first attack.84 
En route to Pearl Harbor Genda tried three times to persuade Nagumo that 
more than one attack would be needed. On the day of the attack, when Com-
mander Mitsuo Fuchida, leader of the strike, landed on Akagi after the first two 
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waves had returned and reported two battleships sunk and four battleships and 
four cruisers severely damaged, Nagumo determined that he had accomplished 
his task and decided to retire, leaving the base and its vital infrastructure intact.85 
The missing carriers would have to wait for another time.
Conceptually, Genda had designed the first two waves to achieve two aims: to 
gain air superiority over Oahu and to deny the Americans the ability to hit back 
at the Japanese task force. For these purposes, carrier-based and land-based air 
forces were the priority targets, then carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc., in de-
scending order. Over half of the attacking aircraft in each wave were committed 
to the air-superiority task, as providing combat air patrol or attacking airfields.86 
The war diary of the 5th Carrier Division (Shōkaku and Zuikaku) reported, “The 
division’s air force attacked enemy air bases on Oahu Island, destroying most of 
the enemy air forces and hangars. Thus enemy fighter interception and counter-
attacks upon our force was crushed.”87
Genda’s plan envisioned, air superiority having been established and the 
Americans denied the means to strike back, follow-on attacks to deny the use of 
Pearl Harbor as an operating base. Their targets were the naval installations first, 
then the remaining ships (Genda did not specify the oil- or fuel-storage tanks as 
specific targets). Genda felt that the potential reward of the follow-on attacks was 
worthwhile even if they cost another hundred planes.88
In the event, the extent of the damage that the two attack waves had inflicted 
on the U.S. air forces in Hawaii would not be known for a number of days.89 The 
Japanese battle-damage assessment listed sixteen hangars and 222 parked air-
planes set on fire, and fourteen planes shot down, with a total of 450 airplanes on 
fire.90 The Japanese after-action study of the Pearl Harbor operation concluded 
that 265 planes had been completely destroyed or shot down.91 Before the attack 
the United States had had over four hundred planes of all types on Oahu, includ-
ing twelve B-17 heavy bombers and over a hundred P-40 fighters. Immediately 
after the attack it could count only four B-17s and twenty-seven P-40s as combat 
ready.92 The Japanese attacks had significantly degraded the Oahu-based air 
forces, leaving the American carriers as the only remaining threat to the Japanese 
task force.
Genda’s original plan had the carrier task force staying in the area of the 
Hawaiian Islands for several days, continually pounding Pearl Harbor and run-
ning down any American surface ships at sea. To ensure unity of command, the 
operation orders had placed a submarine force of some twenty-four boats under 
Nagumo’s command for a three-day period after the initial attack. It anticipated 
that the two forces would be operating together in the Hawaiian area for that time.93 
These details confirm the high, operational-level aims of the original plan, in con-
trast to the much lower, tactical aim of the strike ordered by Admiral Nagumo.
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The Combined Fleet had known from intelligence reports that the American 
battleships and carriers alternated weekends in port at Pearl Harbor. Genda ex-
pected that the attack would be timed to take place when the battleship group 
was in harbor.94 Consequently, during October and November 1941 Genda had 
formulated two plans for searching out and dealing with the American carriers 
if they were not found in Pearl Harbor, having had calculated that there were 
enough fuel and ammunition after the initial attack for at least forty-eight hours 
of further operations.95 
The first was to stay close to Pearl Harbor and control the air over Oahu. He 
felt that the Japanese force could not engage successfully the American carriers in 
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor if it had simultaneously to fight an American carrier 
group and land-based planes. To prevent that, the task force would close Oahu 
and blanket it with fighters to maintain complete air superiority over the island 
while the American carriers were engaged.96 The other plan was to search out the 
American carriers and attack them beyond the range of American land-based 
bombers. This plan too was designed to avoid air attacks from multiple sources. 
Extensive patrols were to be carried out on 8 December to find the American 
carriers. If they were found, the Japanese would attack them regardless of their 
location or distance. If they were not found, the task force would return to Japan, 
via the Marshall Islands. 
Genda’s job during the attack was to coordinate all information from the 
planes and submarines and to prepare contingency plans in case of a counterat-
tack. Genda knew from the advance aerial reconnaissance report that the U.S. 
carriers were not at Pearl Harbor, and search planes had already been sent out 
to find them. In preparation for the expected news that one or more had been 
sighted, the returning horizontal bombers were rearmed with torpedoes for use 
against the carriers. Even the onset of darkness had been accounted for. The Japa-
nese had trained night torpedo-bombing teams on the veteran carriers Akagi, 
Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū; twelve bombers on each of the first two ships and eight 
bombers on each of the latter were certified in night attack.97
Rough seas prevented the strike aircraft from being recovered in a timely man-
ner. Genda felt that, even if Nagumo could have been persuaded to order one, it 
was virtually impossible to launch another attack on Pearl Harbor that day un-
less the force proceeded southward, closer to Oahu. That would take maximum 
advantage of the remaining daylight. Genda was intent on instigating a running 
battle with American targets using smaller groups of aircraft, even at night if 
necessary.98 Beyond that prospect, he had articulated three options for the with-
drawal of the carrier task force from the Pearl Harbor area: 
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• A withdrawal in the direction from which it had approached (i.e., to the 
north and then west) 
• Westward, passing north of Midway
• Southward, passing west of Oahu, then to the Marshall Islands. 
Genda preferred the last option. This route allowed repeated attacks against 
Pearl Harbor over the next three days as the Japanese steamed southward, and 
it offered the best chance of engaging remaining elements of the Pacific Fleet. 
Consistent in all his plans for the initial attack’s sequel was the notion of the task 
force remaining in the area of Oahu for several days to exploit whatever situation 
arose.99 Nagumo, however, chose the first option, since it quickly put his carriers 
beyond the reach of counterattack. 
The Combined Fleet headquarters in the home islands received many of the 
attack reports within minutes of their transmission. A weighty discussion oc-
curred among the staff members as to whether Yamamoto should order Nagumo 
to carry out the “second attack.” Captain Kuroshima, along with most of the staff, 
felt that not enough damage had been inflicted—Pearl Harbor had to be hit again. 
Yamamoto felt that the tactical-level commander was in a better place to judge 
whether a second attack was possible or required and denied Kuroshima’s request 
to issue the second attack order. Kuroshima remained convinced, however, that 
the Pearl Harbor attack was incomplete and told Yamamoto later that Nagumo 
was not a suitable commander for the 1st Air Fleet.100 
Indeed, the initial jubilation over the results of the Pearl Harbor attack soon 
faded. While the damage inflicted against the Pacific Fleet had created the condi-
tions that would allow the Southern Operation to be carried out without imme-
diate interference from it, Yamamoto and his senior staff realized that they had 
missed an excellent opportunity to seize Hawaii. On 9 December 1941, less than 
forty-eight hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto ordered his staff to 
prepare plans for an invasion of Hawaii.101
The new Japanese plan, known as the Eastern Operation, was designed to 
establish Japanese dominance in the Central Pacific. Its timeline began with 
the capture of Midway in June 1942 and ended with the occupation of Oahu in 
March 1943.102 In this process, Rear Admiral Ugaki ordered Watanabe to conduct 
another study of an invasion of Oahu. The new study concluded that Japan would 
now need four divisions and 1.5 million tons of shipping to capture the island, as-
suming that the American carriers had been eliminated as a threat beforehand.103 
This new staff assessment, conducted in mid-January 1942, highlighted the enor-
mousness of the opportunity missed on 8 December. 
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OPPORTUNITY LOST
Genda observed after the war, “In my opinion, Japan had to neutralize American 
bases in the Pacific if she was to carry on the war successfully. Air bombardment 
alone would not neutralize an enemy base; complete neutralization could only 
be achieved if it was occupied by ground troops.”104 He realized even at the time 
that the effects of the Pearl Harbor attack would be transitory and that further 
strikes were needed immediately. Even after Nagumo ordered the task force to 
retire, Genda continued to urge him to stay in the area, to carry out an all-out 
search for the U.S. carriers and, finding them, to attack them day or night.105 His 
protests were to no avail.
During the return trip to Japan, however, Genda presented Nagumo with an-
other plan to strike while the Japanese had the Americans off balance. The Japa-
nese 4th Fleet had run into unexpected opposition in its initial attempt to occupy 
Wake Island on 11 December. The assault had had to be called off, and the 4th 
Fleet had asked for immediate assistance. Instead of returning directly to Japan, 
Genda’s new plan was to take the entire carrier task force to Truk; refuel, resupply, 
and pick up there the landing troops that had occupied Guam, plus those used in 
the first attempt at Wake and the South Seas Fleet troops earmarked for the sei-
zure of Rabaul; and then swiftly invade and occupy Wake, Midway, and Johnston 
Islands. Troop transports had already assembled at Truk for other operations and 
could be easily reassigned.106 Genda’s new plan employed all of the 1st Air Fleet’s 
considerable power in a manner consistent with the concept he had employed in 
designing the attack on Oahu—concentration for maximum impact.
The entire strength of the 1st Air Fleet would engage any American ships 
that tried to oppose it. With Johnston Island and Midway in Japanese hands, air 
coverage could be pushed out to interdict routes across the Central Pacific, and 
land-based aircraft would be within striking distance of Oahu. These islands 
could be used as stepping-stones for the future occupation of Hawaii, which 
Genda thought could be undertaken in 1942, after the occupation of the southern 
area.107 The scale of Genda’s plan and his confidence in the flexibility of Japanese 
naval power are clear indications of his impressive ability to connect the strategic 
imperative with the tactical necessity. 
The Japanese carriers were several hundred miles north of Midway when 
Genda discussed his new plan with Nagumo. The admiral was at first in favor of 
the plan and took steps to execute it.108 On 13 December Nagumo signaled his in-
tent to the carrier task force. His message, issued at 8:20 that morning, conveyed 
two options: the “First Plan” stated that after refueling the force would “speed 
down to south, and, in cooperation with the Fourth Fleet, invade Wake. Then 
Midway, Johnston and Palmyra will be occupied, enemy land based air forces 
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destroyed, paving the way for an invasion of Hawaii.” The “Second Plan” was to 
return straight to Japan.109 
There is no indication that the Combined Fleet was aware of this new idea. 
Kusaka, Nagumo’s chief of staff, was against it; he wanted the carriers to return 
immediately to Japan. Genda planned to fly to Tokyo while the carriers were 
replenishing at Truk to brief Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet staff on the pro-
posal. On 15 December, however, Nagumo received orders from the Combined 
Fleet to support a planned new attempt to invade Wake Island, by destroying 
enemy forces with “an appropriate air force.”110 Nagumo that day issued Task 
Force Order No. 32 to proceed to Truk, where the force was to arrive on or about 
22 December, refuel, and then attack Wake Island.111 Nagumo also canceled an 
attack on Midway that had been ordered (without Genda’s input) by the Com-
bined Fleet. 
However, on 16 December Nagumo changed his mind completely. He canceled 
all previous orders, now directing only the 2nd Carrier Division and supporting 
units to attack Wake Island, the remaining ships to return back to Japan.112 His 
sudden change of mind did not result from direction from Combined Fleet head-
quarters; it can only be assumed that Kusaka had swayed him. 
From an operational perspective, by 13 December the main air and sea threats 
to Japanese expansion in the south had been eliminated. British Force Z—the 
battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse—were sunk on 10 De-
cember. The American air forces in the Philippines, in particular the B-17 bomb-
ers, had been hard hit. The remaining Dutch, British, and American naval units 
in the southern region, lacking direction or cohesion, did not represent a serious 
problem. The only remaining credible naval threat was that of the carriers of the 
Pacific Fleet.
The Japanese plan of seizing airfields and then moving air units progressively 
forward to cover subsequent invasions of new territories worked perfectly. The 
Japanese enjoyed the advantage of air superiority across most of the theater, and 
their amphibious and land operations proceeded as anticipated. The temporarily 
thwarted invasion of Wake Island had been the only setback.113 Given the reality 
of the operational environment on 16 December when Nagumo ordered the re-
turn to Japan, Genda felt that Nagumo’s force had to remain in the Central Pacific 
to concentrate on the U.S. Navy and its carriers. Once they were dealt with, “the 
rest of the Pacific would fall like ripe fruit.”114 Events were to show that once more 
he had an impressive grasp of the situation.
Meanwhile, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, 
had ordered carriers to support the movement of troops and aircraft to reinforce 
Wake. The United States had three carriers available in the theater, but each was 
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operating as a single-carrier task force.115 Unfortunately for the garrison on Wake, 
Kimmel was relieved on 17 December, and the new acting commander in chief, 
Vice Admiral William S. Pye, was not willing to commit his carriers against the 
Japanese 2nd Carrier Division, which was known to be supporting the renewed 
invasion of Wake.116 Pye had to choose between the relief of Wake and the protec-
tion of Hawaii from possible further attack. Pye chose to conserve the carriers for 
future operations and abandoned Wake Island. 
The implementation of Genda’s new plan would have posed a very interesting 
dilemma for Pye and his successor (from 31 December), Admiral Chester Nimitz. 
Instead of just one carrier division, the Pacific Fleet would have confronted all six 
Japanese carriers, working with a now-proven doctrine for mass carrier airpower. 
Successive invasions of Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands in December 1941 
and January 1942 would have forced Nimitz to choose between conserving his 
carriers and protecting Hawaii, in which case not only Wake but Midway and 
Johnston Islands as well would have fallen, or committing his carriers to protect 
one of or all these islands before his theater had received any appreciable rein-
forcements in men, planes, or ships. Japanese control of the three points, let alone 
the destruction of any of or all the American carriers in December 1941 or early 
1942, would have altered the course of subsequent events in 1942. 
Nagumo’s order tasking only the 2nd Carrier Division to attack Wake Island 
is telling. His actions reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the Japanese 
operational-level center of gravity—the six-fleet-carrier task group. As long as 
the Japanese kept their six fleet carriers operating together, they could defeat any 
combination of American carriers then available. Reverting to two-carrier divi-
sions, as was done at Wake and in a number of other operations in Phase One, 
negated that operational advantage and demonstrated that neither the Combined 
Fleet nor Naval General Staff yet understood the fundamental concepts of carrier 
warfare. Had Vice Admiral Pye acted in a more aggressive fashion in the relief of 
Wake Island and reached it before the second landing on 23 December, Admiral 
Yamaguchi’s carriers would have been outnumbered three to two, and the Ameri-
cans would have had a two-to-one advantage in aircraft.117 
Only Genda realized the importance of keeping the fleet carriers together. In 
essence, the Japanese should have recognized two types of operations—those of 
enough value to commit all six fleet carriers, and all the others.118 
But Genda’s influence over future Japanese operational plans ended when 
Nagumo canceled the move to Truk. Genda remained on board Akagi and 
planned air operations for the 1st Air Fleet until April 1942. Interestingly, the 
mistake of failing to attack shore installations was corrected in attacks on British 
bases at Darwin, Australia, in February 1942, and in the Indian Ocean, in March 
and April. Also of note in subsequent Phase One carrier operations was the 
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Combined Fleet’s tactic of deploying a lightly screened carrier division ahead of 
heavy surface units.119 For example, on 16 January the 2nd Carrier Division, with 
one heavy cruiser and two destroyers, was sent into the Banda Sea to spearhead 
the assault against Amboina, while Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō’s force of two 
battleships, three heavy cruisers, and six destroyers patrolled an outer ring well 
to the rear, between Mindanao, Palau, and northern New Guinea. This tactic of 
deploying carriers as screening forces, however, would cost the Japanese dearly 
at the battle of Midway. 
Genda was not available to provide his airpower perspective for the follow-on 
Japanese operations planned for Phase Two, including the renewed NGS and 
Combined Fleet operations to do what Genda had originally intended after Pearl 
Harbor—to take Midway and Johnston Islands. In particular, the Combined 
Fleet plan for Midway, put together by Kuroshima and Watanabe, violated two 
of Genda’s cardinal rules—concentration of force and advancing under air cover. 
These oversights contributed to the Japanese disaster at Midway.120 
The opening Japanese operations of the Pacific War were complex but well 
coordinated. They were characterized by innovative tactics, phased operations, 
and rapid exploitation of success. Although Japanese forces were not strong 
everywhere, elements of the IJA and IJN were able to combine when required to 
provide local superiority. They achieved the strategic intent, acquiring the main 
area of the Co-Prosperity Sphere by the end of Phase One. But they had not de-
stroyed the combat capability of the Pacific Fleet. When the Japanese once again 
faced frontward to finish off their wounded adversary, they found the Americans 
much more capable, organized, and willing to engage. 
Minoru Genda realized that Japan’s long-term success depended on bases but 
also, most importantly, on Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii in 
Japanese hands was a safeguard against American power projection into the 
Central Pacific. Genda felt that Japanese control over the Hawaiian Islands, and 
only that, would set the conditions for a favorable settlement to the war.121 While 
others in the IJN understood the importance of the Hawaiian Islands to a war in 
the Pacific, only Genda had the vision and foresight to conceptualize a means of 
delivering them to the Japanese or, alternatively, denying them to the Americans. 
Genda saw Pearl Harbor as what we would now call the operational center of 
gravity for the war in the Pacific. He generally framed his thoughts in this way: 
he who controls or denies Pearl Harbor to the other side wins the war. There were 
actually three plans for the attack against Pearl Harbor: two developed by Genda 
and the one actually executed by Nagumo. The earlier of the two produced by 
Genda called for the carrier task force to remain near Pearl Harbor for a number 
of days to support the landing of Japanese troops on Oahu on 8 December. This 
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plan was in keeping with Genda’s firm belief that the base was the target, not the 
Pacific Fleet. When the senior members of the Combined Fleet refused to con-
sider this option, Genda switched to a plan to deny the use of Pearl Harbor to the 
Americans by destroying its base and infrastructure. 
Genda later felt that the failure to attack Pearl Harbor repeatedly and to oc-
cupy Midway and Johnston Islands in the first months of the war were two of 
Japan’s greatest “tactical” errors. Genda believed at the time that his Pearl Harbor 
plan held the greatest chance for Japanese success. When that opportunity was 
missed he tried to capitalize on the tactical situation to maintain the initiative 
and occupy Midway and Johnston Islands as quickly as possible.122 This clear and 
immediate threat would have forced Nimitz to respond, fundamentally changing 
the course of events in 1942.
Had the Japanese followed either of Genda’s original plans, the progress of the 
initial stages of the Pacific War would have been significantly different. What 
would have come next is unknowable, and the final outcome would have been the 
same. But within Genda’s operational vision was the best possible “war winning” 
strategy for Japan. However, only after a considerable period of reflection after 
the war would the true brilliance of Genda’s vision be understood. 
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